Eric McGhee and Daniel Krimm
Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC)
Results as of 9 a.m., 6/8/12
New electoral reforms were designed to shake up the status
quo.
California voters recently adopted two
ambitious electoral reforms that first took effect in the recent primary
election. One reform is the establishment of new district boundaries for the
state Assembly, state Senate, and U.S. Congress, drawn by a citizens’
commission. (Ten years ago, the state legislature drew the lines and largely
protected incumbents in the process.) The other reform is a new “top two”
primary system that combines all candidates on a single ballot for all voters,
with the two candidates who receive the most votes, regardless of party,
advancing to the fall election. Both reforms were intended to change the makeup
of the state legislature to increase its accountability to voters and its
ability to reach consensus on major issues.
The new districts have disrupted established incumbents …
The reforms are more complementary than
reinforcing, with each having its own effect. The redistricting has disrupted
established incumbents. There are fewer safe seats, and the average incumbent
had a district that was 45% new territory. In races for the U.S. Congress,
incumbents were forced to run against each other in two districts, and there
was the largest number of open seats—nine—since 1992. The number of open
Assembly seats, 35, was also well above average for the last decade. Only the
number of open Senate seats—nine—was within typical bounds.
… while the top-two primary has altered traditional
patterns of competition.
More incumbents faced primary challenges from
within their own party this year than they have on average in the last five
election cycles (42% vs. 18%). Redistricting does not fully explain this
change, because incumbents in districts that changed a great deal were not
substantially more likely to face a challenge than those in districts that did
not change so much. Instead, the top-two was probably the stronger cause, since
it gives primary challengers a better chance of appearing in the fall election.
Indeed, almost all of the increase in primary challenges occurred in seats
where the odds of a same-party runoff were the best. The top-two also
discouraged competition from minor parties, who are no longer guaranteed a spot
on the fall ballot: districts with no minor or independent candidate were up
(72%, up from 53%). Districts without a candidate from one of the major parties
were also more common this year (16%, up from 7% over the last five elections).
The reforms led to closer outcomes.
The average vote margin was 22 points between
first- and second-place finishers and 11 points between second and third. By
comparison, when the results of past primary elections are tabulated for a
single ballot, as in the top-two, both margins are larger—suggesting that past
races were not as competitive. Why might the top-two increase competition? Two
possibilities: a greater number of competitive candidates and increased
opportunity for voters to cross party lines. Today, in 59% of the races, one
candidate has already received more than 50% of the vote. This number would
also have been larger in the past.
The political establishment suffered some defeats, but
mostly saw victories.
All incumbents who ran this year advanced to
the fall campaign, and all but four finished in first place. Likewise, 101 of
113 non-incumbent candidates endorsed by the major parties advanced. There will
also be 28 same-party runoffs, which fell almost entirely in safe seats. The
one exception is Congressional District 31 in San Bernardino County, which has
more registered Democrats than Republicans but will advance two Republicans
(Gary Miller and Bob Dutton) to the fall campaign. Finally, there were 37 “no
party preference” candidates who rejected both party labels; five of them
advanced to the fall election, all in seats considered safe for either one of
the major parties.
The reforms have disrupted old patterns of
competition
District
|
Assembly
(80 seats)
|
Senate
(20 seats per election,
40 total)
|
U.S. House
(53 seats)
|
|||
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
|
Open seats
|
44%
|
37%
|
45%
|
49%
|
17%
|
5%
|
Same-party competition
|
63
|
46
|
45
|
39
|
79
|
51
|
Same-party incumbent challenge
|
33
|
8
|
27
|
2
|
52
|
31
|
One major party absent
|
14
|
6
|
25
|
12
|
17
|
7
|
Source: California Secretary of State.
Notes:
“Open seats” refers to districts where no incumbent is running. “Same-party
competition” is the percentage of districts where at least one major party has
at least two candidates. “Same-party incumbent challenge” is the percentage of
incumbents running for reelection who face a challenge from within their own
party. “One party absent” is the percentage of districts where one major party
has no candidate.
Competition was fiercer and will continue to the fall election in more places
District
|
Assembly
(80 Seats)
|
Senate
(20 seats per election,
40 total)
|
U.S. House
(53 Seats)
|
|||
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
2012
|
Average
2002–10
|
|
Same-party runoffs
|
23%
|
11%
|
10%
|
15%
|
15%
|
7%
|
Winner > 50%
|
50
|
70
|
80
|
77
|
66
|
88
|
Average gap between 1st- and
2nd-place finishers
|
19
|
28
|
20
|
30
|
28
|
39
|
Average gap between 2nd- and
3rd-place finishers
|
8
|
16
|
19
|
19
|
14
|
17
|
Source: California Secretary of State.
Notes: Comparison
numbers for 2002–2010 were calculated as if the results of those contests had
been combined on a single ballot, as they were for the top-two primary. “Same-party runoffs” refers to the percentage of
districts where two candidates of the same party will face each other in the
fall. “Winner > 50%” is the percentage of top vote-getters who received more
than half the vote. “Average gap” is the gap in vote share between the first- and
second-place finishers, and second- and third-place finishers, respectively.
The gap in vote share between the second and third place finishers shows share
of votes required to change the top two finishers.
Contact: mcghee@ppic.org
Download this summary by clicking http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_ElectoralReformsJTF.pdf
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